Security/Reviews/CloudServices/Marketplace Payments

Status

Identity (TEMPLATE)
Tracker Bug	-
Stage	Definition
Status	Green (Green, Yellow, Red?)
Release Target
Health	-
Status Note	-

Team

Product manager / Feature manager	Lindsay Saunders, Stephanie Turner and Caitlin Galimidi.
Engineering lead
Engineering manager	Payments - Andy McKay Marketplace -
Security lead	Adam Muntner
Privacy lead
Localization lead	Peiying Mo
Accessibility lead	-
QA lead	Krupa Raj
UX lead	Elizabeth Hunt
Product marketing lead
Additional members	Amy Tsay - Community Scott DeVaney - Editorial Manager

Stage 1: Definition

Introduction

Payments tied to Firefox Accounts as a reusable service with all Mozilla properties

Project Links

• Payments team home - https://wiki.mozilla.org/CloudServices/Payments
• Payments tied to FxA project wiki page - https://wiki.mozilla.org/CloudServices/Payments/FirefoxAccounts
• In App Payments - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Marketplace/InAppPayments

Project Links - Mana pages (Mozilla staff/contrib LDAP account needed)

• Addons/Marketplace - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=9601080
• Payments - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/display/MARKET/Payments
• Payments Production Support - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/display/MARKET/Payments+Support
• Processing refunds - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/display/MARKET/Processing+refunds
• Spartacus / Webpay physical network architecture (search page for "Spartacus") - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/display/NOC/VLAN+assignments
• Marketplace / AMO physical infrastructure - https://mana.mozilla.org/wiki/display/SVCOPS/Marketplace+AMO

Project Links - Receipt Verification

• https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Marketplace/Monetization
• https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Marketplace/Monetization/Validating_a_receipt
• https://github.com/mozilla/receiptverifier
• https://inapp-pay-test.paas.allizom.org/

API Docs

• http://firefox-marketplace-api.readthedocs.org/en/latest/topics/payment.html#in-app-products
• http://firefox-marketplace-api.readthedocs.org/en/latest/topics/payment.html#preparing-payment
• http://firefox-marketplace-api.readthedocs.org/en/latest/topics/payment.html#payment-status
• WebPayment API (navigator.Mozpay) - https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebPayment
• Web Payments Provider - https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebPaymentProvider

Related

• Firefox Accounts Payments Proposal - https://wiki.mozilla.org/CloudServices/Payments/FirefoxAccounts
• Jugband engineering metrics and activity for Marketplace - https://jugband.paas.allizom.org/

Historical examples of app payment fraud

• How to detect and prevent in-app payment fraud - http://blog.soom.la/2013/09/how-to-detect-and-prevent-in-app.html
• Apple/Google FTC & EU billing scrutiny - http://yottafire.com/2014/07/apple-is-showing-resentment-with-limit-in-in-app-purchases/
• Kids and in-app purchases, FTC, EU - http://finance.yahoo.com/news/amazon-ready-fight-ftc-app-181013610.html

Use Cases

Webpay is an implementation of the WebPaymentProvider spec. It hosts the payment flow inside navigator.mozPay() when making app purchases or in-app payments on Firefox OS.

• Webpay provides a REST API for clients to interact with the server.
• All API’s use JSON for request and responses.

Data Flows

Diagrams

Payments Flow Sequence

Payments Data Flow Diagram

Pin Flow

(Note: Persona was replaced with FxA)

Architecture Diagram

Top-level architecural view

Payment Systems Diagram

Logical diagram of Payments application services architecture.

Diagram Key

The dotted line from a red service goes to a breakout describing the logical components of its service stack. This is a logical diagram, it does not represent the deployed physical network or server architecture.

Starting from a Red Services box,

• Solid line represents dependency/backend component relationships
• Dotted lines point to breakouts describing the logical components of a service stack

Mozilla Services

Component Name	Description	Documentation URLs
DB1	Example	Example
Solitude	A server for processing payments for Mozilla’s Marketplace and Add-ons site.	Project Documentation - http://readthedocs.org/docs/solitude/en/latest/ Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/solitude
Webpay	Webpay is an implementation of the WebPaymentProvider spec Spartacus is a single page app front-end for Webpay.	Webpay Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/webpay Spartacus Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/spartacus

External Services

Component Name	Description	Documentation URLs
3rd Party Developers	Example	Example
Bango	Example	Example
Firefox Accounts	Example	Documentation - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Identity/Firefox_Accounts Security Review - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Reviews/B2G/FirefoxAccounts
Marketplace Webheads	Example	Example
Proxy	Example	Example

Stage 2: Design

Threat Model

ID	Title	Threat	Proposed Mitigations	Threat Agent	Rating	Likelihood	Impact	Notes
1	malicious access to apps device	If a phone is stolen or given to a friend/family member, it is possible for that person to make purchases.	A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal wiht stolen phone.	Malicious User	12	3	4 – Reputation	In other systems (i.e. iOS, this i a configured parameter.
2	Malicious extension could steal authentication credentials	A rogue extension could possibly steal credentials or cause transactions to happen.	A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials.	Malicious Developer	12	3	4 – Reputation	Must be registered with marketplace.
3	Malicious App creates fake iframe	An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe.	CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials.	Malicious App	12	3	4 – Reputation
4	Malicious App creates fake iframe	An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe.	CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases.	Malicious App	12	3	4 – Reputation
5	XSS vuln could allow malicious user to force purchase	If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase.	CSP is enabled on Payments. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases.	Malicious App	12	3	4 – Reputation
6	CSRF could force purchase.	If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase.	CSRF protection token on the marketplace site. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials.	Malicious App	12	3	4 – Reputation
7	Compromise web heads	The attacker could then leverage their access to attack other parts of the application environment or to serve arbitrary/manipulated content to users.	Mitigation possibilities are being discussed.	System access	12	3	4 – Reputation
8	Appplication Theft	The attacker could begin a payment, cancel the payment, and craft a postback to the app server, fooling it into thinking the cancelled payment was successful. (BID 1145024)	Bug detected, application patched.	System access	12	3	4 – Reputation
9	Appplication Theft	The attacker could modify the JWT for payment to craft $0 payment that executes successfully. (BID 1145024)	Bug detected, application patched.	System access	12	3	4 – Reputation

User Interactions

Payment flow user interactions for

• Marketplace App Payment Flows
• In-App Payment Flows

Marketplace App Payment Flows

Payments flows are initiated from the Marketplace which is under Mozilla’s control

A. Desktop

ID	Actions	Element
1.	Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace)	Popup
2.	Provider payment entry	Popup, page hosted by payment provider
3.	Communication with popup	Javascript library: fxpay

B. Firefox OS / Android

ID	Actions	Element
1.	Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace)	Trusted UI
2.	Provider payment entry	Trusted UI, page hosted by payment provider
3.	Open and communicate with Trusted UI	JavaScript platform function: navigator.mozPay()
4.	Open and communicate with MozPay	JavaScript library: fxpay

In-App Payment Flows

Payment flows are initiated from 3rd party app domains - Mozilla no control over the apps or domains. They have been approved by and have a payments account on the Marketplace, but can change their code at any time (for hosted apps).

A. Desktop

ID	Actions	Element
1.	Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (3rd party app domain)	Popup, page hosted by payment provider
2.	Provider payment entry	Popup, page hosted by payment provider
3.	Communication with popup	Javascript payments library run from 3rd party app domain: fxpay

B. Firefox OS / Android

ID	Actions	Element
1.	Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace)	Trusted UI
2.	Provider payment entry	Trusted UI, page hosted by payment provider
3.	Open and communicate with Trusted UI	JavaScript platform function: navigator.mozPay()
4	Open and communicate with MozPay	JavaScript library: fxpay

Security Recommendations / Open Issues

ID	Title	Status	Summary
[[1]]	Title	Status(Open/Closed)	Summary.
[[2]]	Title	Status(Open/Closed)	Summary.

CEF Logging Requirements

Authentication

• bad password provided at login (or anywhere where user is prompted for auth)
• bad username provided at login
• account created
• password changed
• password reset requested
• new privileged (e.g. reviewer, admin, etc) account created
• account modified and granted additional rights (e.g. reviewer, admin, etc)

Authorization

Denial of Service

Request Specific

Input Validation Exceptions

File Upload

• Large number of file uploads
• Attempt to upload something other than expected file

Privacy Risk Analysis

(Status of and link to privacy review and outcome here)

Stage 3: Planning

Application Security Requirements

It is expected that the Secure Coding Guidelines is followed but these requirements are especially important for this application.

CSP Content Security Policy in blocking mode.

Password Requirements

• Threshold based CAPTCHA for login Restrict password guesses without CAPTCHA to 5.
• Blacklist top bad passwords that could be selected by a user.

Account Requirements

• Allow users to view last login time and IP address after authentication

Coding Requirements

• Session based CSRF protection (e.g. not Django cookie based CSRF protection)
• Clickjacking (x-frame-options) and XSS protection (CSP)

Other Requirements

• Uploaded links must be verified against google safe browsing list (real time or daily cron)
• Uploaded images must be strictly checked to validate only images are uploaded. More Info

SSL Requirements

• SSL is required to the connection to paypal (user redirects and any backend connections)
• The SSL cert must be strictly validated (specific code needed for backend connections)
• HSTS must be enabled
• No HTTP pages. Full HTTPS
• Third party connections (e.g. twitter, facebook, paypal, etc) must link to the HTTPS page for that site. That may require rewriting the widget (twitter specifically)

Operation Security Requirements

Document network/platform security requirements here (e.g. IDS concerns, firewall changes, system hardening reqs, etc)

Critical Security Requirements

Itemize individual security blockers here. Reference components in section AppSec or OpSec subsections. These blockers must be addressed before the product can go live.

Stage 4: Development

Repeatable Security Test Cases

Document individual repeatable security test cases here. Include a reference to the source repo, and documentation that governs how to execute test cases.

Secure Coding Guidelines

Document specific secure coding guidelines to be followed and relate them to specific issues/requirements that are specified; capture bug ids related to those issues.

Code Review Milestones

Table 1 - itemized list of code review milestones {i.e. breakdown of specific components that will be reviewed} Table 2 - list of app components/modules that should trigger additional security review (e.g. auth, csrf, file upload handling, etc)

Stage 5: Release

Application Security Verification

These subsections should contain a list of the steps to be taken, and the status of each activity

Automated Security Testing

• Minion scanner

Landing Criteria

This should be a table itemizing everything from Stage 3 - Critical Security Requirements, including status. For status Red=Unimplemented,Yellow=implemented,Green=tested and passed?

Stage 6: Post Implementation Review

Production Security Considerations

Document additional/ongoing work for this application (e.g. specific things to watch for in ArcSight, gaming behaviour, etc)

Post Implementation Tasks

Itemize process/kb changes developed from this project (e.g. secure coding guidelines, policy stuff, etc)

Team status notes

	status	notes
Products	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-
Engineering	tbd	-